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Abstract 
This study investigates the effects of government R&D programs on firm 
innovation outputs, which are measured by the number of patents, sales from new 
products, and exports. Particularly, we examine the effects of Innovation Fund for 
Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund), which is one of the largest 
government R&D programs that support R&D activities of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in China. Using a panel dataset on Chinese manufacturing firms from 
1998 to 2007, we find that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher 
technological and commercialized innovation outputs compared with their non-
Innofund-backed counterparts and the same firms before winning the grant. Moreover, 
the changes in the governance of Innofund in 2005 from a centralized to a 
decentralized one because of policy amendments have significant effects on the 
effectiveness of the program. Specifically, the magnified effects of Innofund on 
technological innovation outputs become significantly stronger after the governance 
of Innofund becomes more decentralized. Identification problems are addressed by 
utilizing both propensity score matching and two-stage estimation approaches. 
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1. Introduction  
Government funding for corporate research and development (R&D) is a 
major practice in most countries. The major rationale for such government initiative is 
that firms may underinvest in R&D under a free market because of the externalities 
generated by these activities (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962), as well as the information 
issues associated with these projects (Greenwald et al., 1984; Hall and Lerner, 2009). 
Hence, government engagement is raised as a mechanism to respond to market 
failures (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1990). Underinvestment in R&D has been 
well reasoned theoretically and is evident empirically. However, determining the 
extent to which government intervention could stimulate firms to invest more in R&D 
and consequently improve their economic and technological performance is a 
challenging empirical question.  
Empirical findings on the effects of government R&D programs are 
inconclusive. Griliches and Regev (1998) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) find 
that government-subsidized firms achieve higher productivity and profitability in 
Israel and Japan, respectively. Moreover, such firms grow faster (Lerner, 2000), 
access other external finances more successfully (Lerner, 2000; Aschhoff, 2009), 
invest more in R&D activities (Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 
2007; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013), and generate 
higher social returns than their counterparts do (Griliches and Regev, 1998; Irwin and 
Klenow, 1996). Nevertheless, a considerable number of studies also indicate that 
public R&D programs have not stimulated firm performance (Klette and Møen, 1999; 
Brander et al., 2008) or have limited positive effects on corporate R&D spending, 
except for small firms (Lööf and Hesmati, 2005) or research-oriented projects 
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(Clausen, 2009). Several studies even find that government R&D subsidies crowd out 
private R&D inputs (crowding out effect), thereby consequently reducing social 
welfare and growth (David, et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2013).  
The mixed findings on the effects of government R&D programs have several 
implications. First, institutions may influence the effects of such R&D programs. 
Public R&D finance is introduced as a solution to the underinvestment in R&D 
activities by profit-driven businesses. Institutions affect the degree of the role of the 
market in allocating resources and the efficiency of the government (Acemoglu et al., 
2005). As a result, the institutions under which the market interacts with government 
initiatives are ultimately important to determine the success of the government R&D 
initiatives. Indeed, empirical studies find that the effects of public R&D subsidies 
across countries exhibit significant heterogeneity (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 
2000; Cincera et al., 2009). Moreover, a few works based on U.S. data demonstrate a 
crowding-out effect of public R&D programs (e.g., Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2013), whereas most studies based on data from non-U.S. countries find universally 
positive effects of such programs despite the variation in the degree of complementary 
influence (e.g., Lach, 2002; Cincera et al., 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013). 
Second, even under similar institutions, the governance of these public R&D 
programs may result in variations on the incentives provided to government agencies 
who allocate the resources. Government agencies play an essential role in allocating 
resources through public R&D programs. Thus, the governance of these programs 
will expectedly affect their effectiveness. However, to our knowledge, focus on the 
governance of government R&D programs and its effects is insufficient. Third, 
endogeneity issues in empirical examinations resulting from data constraints are also 
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a major challenge in existing studies, which may have also contributed to the 
conflicting findings (Klette et al., 2000).  
This study attempts to fill some of the abovementioned gaps. We examine the 
effects of Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund) 
on the innovation outputs of firms. Innofund is the largest government program that 
aims to support corporate R&D activities of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in China. Specifically, we address two major questions. First, we examine 
whether Innofund enables firms to generate more outputs on both commercialized 
innovation (measured by sales from new products and exports) and technological 
innovation (measured by patent counts). Second, we estimate whether the changes in 
Innofund governance brought about by the exogenous policy shock in 2005 influence 
the effects of Innofund.  
Using a panel dataset on Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007, we 
find that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher innovation outputs (both 
commercial and technological innovation outputs) than their non-Innofund-supported 
counterparts and themselves before gaining Innofund support. We also observe 
stronger magnified effects of Innofund on technological innovation outputs (measured 
by the count of newly granted patents) after 2005 when Innofund governance shifted 
from a centralized screening system to a more decentralized one. Our results imply 
that decentralized governance is more effective than the centralized one in public 
R&D investments.  
The major challenge with estimations on public R&D programs is the 
identification issues that result from selection biases and omitted variables. We 
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attempt to address these identification concerns by using two approaches, i.e., 
propensity score matching (PSM) and two-stage estimations with instrumental 
variables (IVs). We use the PSM approach to match Innofund-backed firms with non-
Innofund-backed firms on the basis of various criteria that may predict the probability 
of a firm being selected by Innofund and the future innovation potentials of the firm. 
Subsequently, we employ two-stage estimations with two IVs to further address 
endogeneity issues. The first IV refers to the total number of firms located in high-
tech zones in a given city for a given year. The second IV refers to the ratio of annual 
investments in fixed assets made by local governments over GDP at the county level 
for a given year. Both IVs reflect how ambitious the local governments are. We 
suggest that the more ambitious the local governments are, the more likely they 
support local firms to participate in Innofund program competition and also exert 
more effort to lobby the upper-level governments for local firms to win Innofund 
grants. Statistically, the two-stage estimations confirm the relevance and the 
exogeneity of the IVs, thereby indicating that the two IVs are qualified. Our major 
findings remain robust after the identification issues are addressed.  
Our study differs from and complements the existing literature in three aspects. 
First, our study is the first one that links the governance of the government R&D 
programs and the effects of such programs. The Innofund program, which was 
initiated by the central government in 1999, underwent a significant change in its 
governance in 2005 when the central government decided to shift from a centralized 
project screening system into a relatively decentralized one. This exogenous policy 
change provides us with the opportunity to scrutinize the use of the quasi-experiment 
approach and determine how governance of public R&D programs influences the 
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effects of such programs. Our study proves that the governance of government R&D 
programs is an important factor that contributes to the effects of such programs. 
Second, this study is among the first examinations on the effects of government R&D 
programs in China. The Chinese government has been deeply involved in businesses, 
particularly in resource allocation. The inefficiencies that result from the involvement 
of the Chinese government in business are well documented (Brandt et al., 2013; Guo 
et al., 2014). Thus, China serves as an interesting case to examine whether 
government R&D support is effective in an economy where “government failures” are 
rampant and the market remains immature. Third, we employ two approaches to 
address the identification concerns in this study. Most existing studies on government 
R&D programs mainly employ PSM approach to mitigate selection biases. In our 
study, we not only employ PSM but also apply two-stage estimations to control the 
potential concerns with missing variables. Hence, we attempt to shed some light on 
the existing discussions with regard to why empirical findings are inconclusive in 
terms of the effects of government R&D programs.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background of the Innofund program and the policy changes it underwent 
in 2005. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings on whether Innofund affects innovation outputs of firms and examines the 
robustness of the results. Section 5 reports the findings on the effects of the policy 
change of Innofund governance. Section 6 provides the conclusions.  
2. Institutional Background of the Innofund Program 
2.1 Introduction of Innofund Program 
Innofund Program is a special government R&D program established upon the 
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approval of the State Council in May 1999. Innofund aims to “facilitate and 
encourage the innovation activities of small and medium technology-based 
enterprises (SMTEs) and commercialization of research by way of financing, trying to 
bring along and attract outside financing for corporate R&D investment of SMTEs.” 
At the same time, as a nonprofit-making government policy, “it is oriented towards 
social welfare induced by positive effect of innovation.”1 
The principal criteria for applying to Innofund are as follows: The project 
should comply with national industrial technology policies, exhibit relatively high 
potential for economic and social benefits, and competitive in the market. The 
applicant should be a business corporation with generally not more than 500 
employees, not less than 30% of which should have received higher education. The 
annual R&D investment of the firm should be at least more than 3% of the total sales, 
and the number of R&D employees should be more than 10% of the total number of 
employees. Firms with leading products in the market with an economy of scale 
production must also exhibit good economic performance. The following projects are 
prioritized: projects with advanced technology or independent intellectual property 
rights and high value added; projects established by researchers or overseas returnees 
to commercialize their scientific achievements; innovation projects jointly initiated by 
firms, universities, and research institutions; and projects that utilize new and 
advanced technologies to revive the stock assets of traditional industries and drive job 
creation. 
Innofund provides three forms of financing, namely, appropriation, interest-
free bank loans, and equity investment. Appropriation is provided as start-up capital 
                                                     
1 Source: http://www.innofund.gov.cn/ 
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for small firms founded by a researcher with scientific achievements. Partial subsidies 
are also provided to SMEs for the development of new products and pilot production. 
The total amount of subsidies for an individual project is generally between 1–2 
million RMB. Firms are required to provide dollar-to-dollar matching investments in 
the funded projects. Interest-free loans are provided mainly to SMEs that require 
external financing from commercial banks to expand the production of innovative 
projects. Generally, equity investment is reserved for projects that use advanced 
technology, have high innovation capacity, and have market potential in emerging 
industries. On average, Innofund support should not exceed 20% of the registered 
capital of the investee firm. 
From 1999 to 2011, Innofund provided more than 19.17 billion RMB to 
30,537 projects, 27,498 (86%) of which were supported through appropriation, 2,880 
through interest-free loans, and 1,159 through other forms, including bank loan 
insurance, equity investment, and other forms of subsidies. The size of direct 
investments by Innofund appears to be modest compared with the total expenditure 
for government R&D in China. However, according to official reports, Innofund has 
induced 1:11 external financing from local governments, banks, and venture 
capitalists. Innofund has also incubated several innovative projects of world-class 
high-tech firms, such as Zhongxingwei and Huawei. Since 1999, the program has 
created approximately 450,000 new jobs and generated 209.2 billion RMB in sales, 
22.5 billion RMB in tax income, and 3.4 billion RMB in exports. By the end of 2008, 
82 out of 273 publicly listed companies in China’s SME Stock Exchange were once 
supported by Innofund.2 
                                                     
2 http://www.innofund.gov.cn/. 
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2.2  Innofund Governance Before and After 2005  
The governance of Innofund Program underwent a systematic change in 2005. 
In general, two levels of government agencies are involved in the management of 
Innofund. At the central level, the Innofund Administration Center (IAC) under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is in charge of Innofund operations, 
including the issuance of the application guide, preparation of proposals for the 
preferred fields and industries to support for each year,3 screening and evaluation of 
projects ex-ante, signing of contracts with firms, and conducting post-investment 
project assessments. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) plays a regulatory role and 
approves the application guidelines and yearly budget, transfers funds to the IAC 
twice a year, and assesses IAC operation. The MOST and MOF report yearly to the 
State Council on the operation and performance of Innofund. The IAC must adhere to 
the principles of honest application, fair processing, strict selection, and transparent 
administration. According to IAC reports, fraudulent cases for each year constituted 
less than 0.5% of the total projects for the past 10 years.  
At the local level, each province has an Innofund office under the Provincial 
Science and Technology Committee, which reports to the IAC. The role of the local 
Innofund office was transformed substantially in 2005 when the Innofund 
administration was reformed. The policy changes simplified the application processes, 
decentralized the screening and evaluation of projects, and delegated more power to 
local Innofund offices in project selection.  
Before 2005, the Innofund administration was hierarchical and centralized. 
Local Innofund offices principally acted as bridges between IAC, and the local firms 
                                                     
3 A consulting committee composed of technology and management specialists, economists, and 
entrepreneurs help identify preferred areas to support and provide advice on Innofund guidelines. 
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had no considerable involvement in project selection. The local Innofund offices had 
three major responsibilities. These offices delivered and promoted IAC guidelines and 
policies to local firms or agencies to guide them in preparing the required application 
documents. The local offices also collected the application documents and certified 
the qualifications of applicants. Finally, the local offices recommended and forwarded 
the application documents of qualified projects to the IAC. Subsequently, a panel of 
experts at the IAC evaluated the submitted applications and promulgated the final 
funding decisions. Local Innofund offices were only recommendatory bodies that did 
not contribute in the final decisions of the awardees. No resources were to be 
allocated by the local governments to the recommended projects until the IAC 
announced its final decision. After the IAC reached a decision, the provincial Bureau 
of Finance was normally required to match 50% of the total support from the central 
government to IAC-sponsored projects. 
In 2005, the operations and governance of Innofund were reformed, and a new 
application and screening system was introduced. The system considerably increased 
the transparency of project screening and decentralized decision making in project 
selection. The role of local Innofund offices was substantially shifted. Local 
governments at the provincial level were now required to set up their own Innofund 
programs and take responsibility for the initial project selection. In particular, project 
assessments by local Innofund offices constitute 30% of the final decision of the IAC. 
Moreover, in contrast to previous practice, local Innofund offices are required to 
commit at least 50% of the proposed support (25% for provinces in Western China) to 
selected local projects before even recommending the projects to the IAC. The list of 
projects that local offices plan to recommend must be published in their websites for 
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two weeks before the applications are submitted to IAC. Accordingly, these offices 
must respond to public criticisms on their proposed projects. 
The policy change in 2005 fundamentally changed the ex-ante project 
screening of the Innofund Program. The major feature of this policy change is the 
delegation of power on project selection to local Innofund offices. Compared with the 
hierarchical decision making process, the decentralization of decision making may 
reduce inefficiencies that result from the hierarchical decision making process by 
solving information issues and considering that local officers have more knowledge 
on local firms. Thus, information issues can be addressed immediately. The delegation 
of decision making power and the newly introduced co-investment mechanism also 
aligned with the interests of local and central governments, and provided more 
incentives to local Innofund offices in terms of project screening and monitoring. 
Indeed, anecdotes reveal that the reforms introduced in 2005 ushered in creative 
operations of local Innofund offices. For example, Zhejiang province further 
delegated decision making powers on project screening to lower administrative levels, 
such as city or county governments. In Chongqing and Hunan provinces, the local 
Innofund offices cooperated with other government and consulting agencies, such as 
the local industrial and commercial bureau, tax bureau, law firms, and accounting and 
auditing firms, to collect information on candidate firms for project selection. These 
efforts are also reflected in the total amount of funds granted by the local Innofund 
offices. According to the official report of the Innofund program in 2005, local 
governments recommended a total of 4,207 projects, and the amount of funds 
committed by local government was more than 1.2 billion RMB or approximately six 
times that used by the local government to provide matching funds before 2005. We 
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expect this systematic change in the governance of Innofund to influence the effects 
of the program.  
3. Data and Sample  
3.1 Variables and Data Sources  
We are interested in the changes in innovation outputs, particularly on 
commercialized and technological innovation outputs of the firms after they receive 
support from Innofund. Commercialized innovation outputs are measured by annual 
sales from new products and exports of a firm, whereas technological innovation 
outputs are measured by the number of newly granted patents of a firm for each year. 
We also control several firm-specific variables including age, size, leverage ratio, and 
ownership structure of firms (detailed definitions of the variables can be found in 
Table A-1).  
Our data are acquired mainly from three sources. Basic information on 
Innofund-backed firms is obtained from the Innofund Program website 
(http://www.innofund.gov.cn). The names of Innofund-awarded firms have been 
publicly announced on the website each year since 1999. The website provides the 
names and addresses of the firms, the nature of the projects, the date the firm was 
granted Innofund support, the type of support from Innofund, and the results of 
performance evaluation of the project (i.e., terminated during the process or finished 
on time and achieved the proposed goal). Firm-level data on financial information, 
sales from new products, exports, and other firm-specific characteristics are obtained 
from the Above-scale Industrial Firms Panel 1998-2007 (ASIFP). ASIFP is composed 
of all state- and non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales of at least 
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5 million RMB (US$750,000) between 1998 and 2007. This database provides 
sophisticated financial data and other firm-specific information, including location, 
industry, age, and ownership structure. Patent data are obtained from the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) patent database. The SIPO database provides 
complete information on all patents granted in China, including the application and 
publication number of the patent, application and grant year, IPC classification 
number, type of the patent, and assignee of the patent.  
3.2 Data Matching  
The first challenge in this study is data matching because the names of the 
firms listed in the three databases may not be fully consistent. First, we need to match 
the list of Innofund-backed firms in the Innofund website with the list in the ASIFP 
database to identify which firms in the ASIFP database have won Innofund support 
and obtain detailed financial information for these firms. We employ both 
computerized matching and manual matching approaches to match the two databases. 
As mentioned, both the Innofund website and ASIFP provide information for the 
names, locations (at city level), and industries of the firms by year. ASIFP also 
provides information for the legal person code of all the firms in the database. We use 
these information to conduct the matching.  
First, we apply a three-stage matching strategy for the computerized matching, 
which is similar to that used by the NBER Patent Data Project4, to ensure accuracy of 
the matching. In the first step, we standardize the firm names in the two databases to 
prepare for the matching. Under the Company Law of China, a company name must 
                                                     
4 https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home. 
 14 
 
contain four elements, namely, a trade name, industry sector, legal entity identifier 
(e.g., Limited Liability Company or Joint Stock Limited Liability Company), and the 
administrative region. We first create a “standard name” for a firm by removing the 
punctuations, spaces, or other special characters (e.g., !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, -, =, [, /, ], 
\,  etc.)5 and standardizing the legal entity identifiers (e.g., we converted Limited into 
Ltd.). This step is carried out to prevent the matching quality from being affected by 
inconsistencies in the formats of firm names listed in the two databases. Moreover, we 
created a “stem name” for each firm by removing the administrative region and legal 
entity identifiers in the firm name (e.g., a firm called “Beijing Tian Fa Logistics Ltd” 
is changed to “Tian Fa Logistics”). This step is carried out to prevent the matching 
quality from being affected by the mistake driven by input errors with legal entity 
identifiers or administrative regions of firms. 
In the second stage, we identify Innofund-backed firms from ASIFP by 
conducting matching with “standard names”, “stem names”, and other information in 
the two databases by Innofund awarding year. We first accurately match the two 
databases using the “standard names”, locations (at city level), and standard industry 
codes (SICs) of firms for the year when Innofund-backed firms won the grant. If a 
firm was awarded an Innofund grant in 2000, then we use the aforementioned 
matching information of the firm listed in the Innofund website of the said year to 
match with that of the firms listed in ASIFP of the same year. We generate a matched 
file called “full marching_2000” for the matching results of 2000. Year and location 
are ultimately important in matching. According to the Company Law of China, a 
company has an exclusive right to its name on a regional basis. A company name 
                                                     
5 These characters may be input into the names of the databases by mistakes.  
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must be unique and identical within its region. Thus, if a firm has exact the same 
Chinese name and location in the two databases for the same year, then it should be 
the same firm. We repeat this procedure for each Innofund awarding year and the 
counterpart year of ASIFP, and generate the matching files by year accordingly.  
Next, we repeat the previously mentioned matching procedures by replacing 
the “standard names” with the “stem names” and generate a matched file called 
“partial matching” for each Innofund awarding year. We use ”stem names” to conduct 
additional matching to determine potential missed cases during matching 
using ”standard names” (we may not have exhausted all the expressions of the legal 
entity identifiers and converted them into standard identifiers when we created 
“standard names”). Finally, we combine the matching results of the ”full matching” 
and “partial matching” by year and delete duplicates using the legal person codes of 
each firm by year. After these matching procedures, we generate a cross-sectional 
dataset for each year between 1998 and 2007 in which Innofund-backed firms are 
identified in ASIFP for the year when they obtained the grant.  
After the computerized matching, we conduct manual matching. We manually 
check all Innofund-backed manufacturing firms that are not matched by computerized 
matching using online search engines such as Google and Baidu. We mainly focus on 
checking the names, business nature, legal person codes, and Innofund granting 
records of the firms to ensure that we do not miss some observations because of slight 
variations of the trade names of firms listed in the two databases. Similarly, after the 
manual matching, we establish a cross-sectional dataset for each year in which 
Innofund-backed firms that are missed in computerized matching are identified in 
ASIFP for the year they obtained the grant.  
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Finally, we merge all identified Innofund-backed firms into ASIFP. We first 
combine the yearly matching results from the computerized and manual matching by 
year and create a pooled cross-sectional dataset entitled “final matching” for each year 
in which all Innofund-backed firms are identified from ASIFP for the year they won 
the grant. We thereby obtain the legal person codes of all identified Innofund-backed 
firms and distinguish the time when the firm was awarded an Innofund grant. Finally, 
2,638 firms that won backing from Innofund at least once between 1999 and 2007 are 
identified for the estimations.6 We build the panel data for the identified firms by 
merging the firms listed in “final matching” into ASIFP by year and adding two 
dummy variables into ASIFP to distinguish whether the firm won and when it won 
Innofund (Brandt et al., 2012). The final sample consists of 18,224 firm-year 
observations for Innofund-backed firms.   
With this matching strategy, we ensure that the variations or the changes of 
firm names over the years will not affect the quality of our matching. First of all, by 
controlling the “standard names”, locations (at city level), industries of firms, and the 
year in computerized matching, we may ensure that type I error does not occur in 
matching. According to the Company Law of China, a company name must contain 
four elements, namely, a trade name, industry sector, legal entity identifier (e.g., 
Limited Liability Company or Joint Stock Limited Liability Company), and the 
                                                     
6 The number of Innofund-backed firms for the estimations dropped substantially from 11,977 (the number of 
project backed between 1999 and 2007) to 2,638 for estimations during the examination period because of several 
reasons. The ASIFP database covers manufacturing firms only; therefore, we cannot include non-manufacturing 
firms backed by Innofund, thus reducing the number of Innofund-backed firms in the sample. Non-state-owned 
firms with sales of less than RMB 5 million are also not included in the ASIFP. Hence, we may have missed 
several micro-sized firms backed by Innofund. One of the aims of the study is to estimate the ex-post effects of 
Innofund. An Innofund-backed firm that lacks information on the year when it received funding is also excluded. 
Theoretically, we included all state-owned manufacturing firms supported by Innofund and non-state-owned 
manufacturing firms with more than 5 million RMB in sales (in the year of application) backed by Innofund for the 
estimations.  
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administrative region. Moreover, a company has an exclusive right to its name on a 
regional basis. Thus, if the Chinese name, location, and industry of a company are 
shown exactly the same in both databases in the same year, then it must be identified 
as the same company. Year is an important factor to secure the accuracy of the 
matching. Firms are considered identical only when the firm names can be matched in 
the same year shown in both databases. Moreover, to prevent type II errors in 
matching, we apply computerized matching by replacing the “standard names” with 
“stem names” and manual matching. Such procedures prevent the matching quality 
from being affected by the variations in firm names shown in the two databases.   
Finally, our matching quality would also be unaffected by the variations or 
changes of firm names over time. First, the final panel database for Innofund-backed 
firms is not built up by firm names. Rather, we establish the panel by legal person 
codes of firms based on the cross-sectional data matched by firm names and other 
information by year. According to the China’s Company Registration Rules, the legal 
person code of a company is unique nationwide and will not change after the 
registration of a legal entity even if its name or business nature is changed. By using 
the legal person codes, we identified firms by year to match and build up the panel 
database. Thus, the changes of firm name over time cannot affect the matching quality.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms. Panel 
A shows the industry distribution of Innofund-backed firms. Innofund support is 
concentrated mainly on eight industries that belong to high-tech industries as defined 
by the National Bureau of Statistics. A total of 81% of the sampled Innofund-backed 
firms belong to high-tech industries. The allocation of Innofund is consistent with the 
goal of government R&D programs to support corporate R&D activities. Panel B 
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presents the year distribution of Innofund-backed firms on the basis of the time they 
received their first round of Innofund grant. We show the distribution of awarding 
year for the sampled Innofund-backed firms in this study and the full sample of 
Innofund-backed projects. Results show that from 1999 to 2007, the sampled 
Innofund-backed firms have similar year distributions -like those in the full sample, 
thereby suggesting the representativeness of our sample in this aspect.  
This study also needs to match the firms in the ASIFP database with those in 
the SIPO patent database to identify patent information for all firms in the estimations. 
In general, three types of patents exist in China, namely, invention, utility, and design 
patents. Invention patents are subject to examinations similar to those conducted in 
other major patent offices in the world. This type of patent is given 20 years of 
protection and may be granted to the methods and products. Both utility and design 
patents are given 10 years of protection. Utility patents are generally granted to 
technical solutions related to shapes or structures, whereas design patents are 
normally granted to shapes and patterns with patentable aesthetic appeal. Firms have 
to exert considerable effort to generate patentable materials, although invention 
patents are the most technologically innovative and thus require more R&D efforts 
than the two other types. In this study, we measure patent outputs using two values: 
the number of invention patents and the number of patents of all types granted to a 
firm in a given year. Given that creating patentable works and applying for a patent 
take time, we use filing time of newly granted patents as a basis in panel estimations. 
We also use the one-year lag of filing time for all estimations to check the robustness 
of the results.  
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The matching strategy we apply to match ASIFP and SIPO is significantly 
similar to that which is used to match the name lists of Innofund-backed firms and the 
ASIFP. However, the major difference is that SIPO does not provide information for 
the industry of a firm that we do not control in the matching. However, this issue will 
not affect the quality of our matching. As we discussed earlier, firm names, location 
and year are the details that are needed to secure the accuracy of the matching.   
A potential concern with patent matching is the potential miscount of patents 
for the subsidiaries of firms. According to the Patent Law of China, organizational 
patent applicants must provide the registration license while applying to file a patent, 
thereby suggesting that a firm that applies for patents must be an independent legal 
entity. Patents applied by subsidiaries that are not registered as independent legal 
entities will be filed to the parent firm. Similarly, only an independent legal entity will 
be recognized as an individual firm. Therefore, our matching approach, which is  
based on both the names and locations of firm (for cross-sectional data matching by 
year) and legal person codes (for panel construction), should not be affected 
negatively by miscounts for firm subsidiaries.  
3.2 Sampling: PSM    
We estimate the effects of Innofund on firm innovation outputs by 
constructing a control group of non-Innofund-backed firms. We build the control 
group with several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific 
matching method and control for selection biases. We first identify firms that are 
eligible to apply for Innofund but did not apply or did not win the grant from the 
ASIFP Database. The Innofund selection criteria are officially announced each year. 
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A firm is eligible for Innofund application if its SIC 7 is similar to the SICs of the 
awarded group, has fewer than 500 employees, and has a leverage ratio lower than 
70%. The Innofund program also requires that R&D investments of a firm should be 
more than 3% of the total sales, and the number of R&D employees should be more 
than 10% of the total number of employees.8 
After identifying all eligible firms, we utilize a PSM algorithm proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to construct the control group on the basis of the 
identified pool of eligible firms. In the context of our study, the propensity score 
refers to the predicted probability of a firm to receive Innofund support. According to 
the screening criteria of Innofund program introduced in Section 2, firms with 
potential to generate high economic and social benefits, firms with leading products in 
the market, firms with projects that utilize new and advanced technologies or with 
independent intellectual property rights and high value added, and projects that utilize 
new and advanced technologies will be prioritized. That is, innovation potentials are 
the major consideration when Innofund selects projects to support. Therefore, 
innovation performance is our major focus in designing the PSM algorithm. When 
non-Innofund-backed firms are constructed on this propensity score, we ensure that 
the matched non-Innofund-backed firms are selected based on their two-digit SIC 
industry code, location, size, leverage ratio, sales from new products, exports, and 
stock of patents. Following the suggestion of Démurger et al. (2002), we control the 
location to capture disparities in regional growth rates and levels of development, 
which may affect the results. We also match the size and leverage ratio of Innofund-
                                                     
7 The National Bureau of Statistics in China updated the SIC system in 2003. Thus, we amend the two-digit SIC 
before 2003 to maintain consistency with the latest code system.  
8 ASIFP does not provide information on human capital and presents only data on R&D investment from 2005 to 
2007. Thus, we cannot utilize the R&D investment and human capital information as criteria for the control group 
sample construction.  
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backed firms and their counterparts. These criteria ensure that Innofund-backed and 
non-Innofund-backed firms are similar in many aspects, which may affect the 
probability of being supported by Innofund and their innovation outputs in the future. 
Specifically, we use one-to-five nearest-neighbor PSM to identify non-Innofund-
backed firms. We also impose common support restrictions during matching. 9 
Moreover, to assess matching quality, we check whether significant differences in 
relevant variables between Innofund-backed and matched non-Innofund-backed firms 
can be found by following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). Table 2 presents the results 
of the balance tests of both the randomly drawn sample10  and the PSM matched 
sample on major innovation measurements. T-statistics indicated that the relevant 
variables are balanced between the Innofund-backed firms and the PSM matched 
sample. 11 
The major shortcoming of the ASIFP database that affects our PSM is that 
ASIFP provides data on R&D expenditure only from 2005 to 2007 and does not 
provide detailed information on human capital. Thus, we cannot utilize R&D 
investment and information on human capital as criteria to construct the control group 
sample. However, given that R&D expenditure is one of the most important factors 
that may affect innovation outputs, we utilize R&D investment information as criteria 
to match a subsample of Innofund firms that obtained funding in 2005 and 2007 to 
check the robustness of the results (see Section 4 for details).  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-
backed firms in the PSM control group, including the number of observations, mean, 
                                                     
9 Our results are robust after we remove the common support restrictions. 
10 We construct a randomly draw sample of the control group and present the difference between the sample 
matched by PSM approach and the randomly draw sample to further justify why we have to employ the PSM 
sample in order to reduce the selection biases.  
11 The balance tests for other variables are available upon request.  
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maximum, and standard deviations across the entire examination period. On average, 
Innofund-backed firms have higher innovation outputs in terms of the number of 
newly granted patents and sales from new products. Similarly, these firms are younger 
and larger in size as measured by total sales and total assets. These firms also have 
lower liability compared with non-Innofund-backed firms. No considerable difference 
was observed in exports between the two groups.  
4. Does Innofund Affect Innovation Outputs?  
 In our subsequent analysis, we examine whether the Innofund Program 
stimulates innovation outputs. First, we compare the innovation outputs of Innofund-
backed firms with those of non-Innofund-backed firms. Second, we examine whether 
the amount of Innofund grant is associated with innovation outputs. Finally, we 
address the identification issues using two-stage regression models.  
4.1 Innovation Outputs of Innofund-backed and Non-Innofund-backed Firms  
We test whether the Innofund Program helps firms generate more innovation 
outputs by implementing fixed effect panel data regression through the following 
basic regression models: 
 
 
where i indices a firm,  indices time, and yit are dependent variables used to measure 
the innovation output of firm  at time . The innovation outputs include sales from 
new products, exports, and newly granted patents. InnoAftit is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm gained Innofund support at time t and equals zero if otherwise. A 
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vector of control variables is indicated by .  controls time-invariant firm-specific 
unobserved variables, and  controls yearly fixed effects. The effect of Innofund on 
innovation outputs is represented by . We use a fixed effect panel data model to 
estimate (1.1) when the dependent variables are exports, sales from new products, and 
patent counts in log-link formulation. We utilize a logit model for panel data to 
estimate (1.2) when the dependent variables are dummy variables of sales from new 
products and exports. The standard errors for correlation are adjusted within the 
cluster in all models (Petersen, 2009). 
Table 4 presents the results on the effects of Innofund on innovation outputs of 
firms. Models (1) to (4) show that  is significantly and positively associated 
with sales from new products and exports of firms, whether these values are measured 
by absolute figures or dummy variables. These findings suggest that Innofund-backed 
firms generate significantly higher sales from new products and exports after gaining 
government support compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms 
before funds were infused. Meanwhile, the probability that Innofund-backed firms 
generate sales from new products and exports is significantly higher than that of non-
Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the funds were infused. For 
example, Model (2) shows that, given the other things being equal, the probability that 
a firm generates sales from new products will increase by 7.88% after the firm wins 
Innofund support. Similarly, Model (4) shows that winning Innofund support can help 
to increase the probability that a firm generates export by 2.41%. 
Models (5) and (6) present the estimations of how Innofund affects newly 
granted patents and show that Innofund significantly and positively motivates firms to 
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generate more patents. We examine both the number of patents of all types and the 
number of invention patents in logarithm format. The coefficients of  in 
Models (5) and (6) are significantly positive, thereby indicating that Innofund-backed 
firms generate more new patents of all types and more invention patents after winning 
Innofund support compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms 
before the grant. For instance, Model (5) shows that the growth rate of newly granted 
patents of all types for Innofund-backed firms after the grant is 13.2% higher than that 
of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before winning the grant. Model (6) 
shows that the growth rate of newly granted invention patents for Innofund-backed 
firms after the grant of funds is 8.6% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms 
and the same firms before the grant. In summary, Table 4 shows that Innofund 
effectively influences the innovation outputs of awarded firms. Our results remain the 
same when we use the one-year lag for patent filing time. 
The monetary effect of the funding is also examined. The estimation focuses 
on the total amount of Innofund support given to firms. Thus, we may obtain more 
insightful ideas on the extent to which government R&D funding addresses the 
financial constraints of firms in China where resource allocation is biased. The 
amount of funding (InnoAmtit) is used to replace  in Equations 1.1 and 1.2. 
The results are presented in Table 5. Models (1) to (4) show that InnoAmtit is 
significantly and positively correlated with the sales from new products and exports of 
firms. These findings imply that firms that win a larger Innofund grant may generate 
significantly higher sales from new products and exports. Meanwhile, the probability 
of generating sales from new products and exports increases as the size of Innofund 
support increases. For example, Model (2) shows that if a firm wins a funding of 
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1 million RMB, then the probability that the firm generates sales from new products 
increases by 11.73%. Similarly, Model (4) shows that if a firm wins a funding of 
1 million RMB, the probability that the firm generates export increases by 2.63%. 
Model (5) shows that after winning a funding of 1 million RMB, the growth of 
newly granted patents of all types generated by Innofund-backed firms is 20% higher 
than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the grant. Model (6) 
shows that a funding of 1 million RMB results in the 10% higher growth of newly 
granted invention patents generated by Innofund-backed firms compared with non-
Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the grant. The results shown in 
Table 5 imply that the amount of Innofund support affects the innovation outputs of 
firms significantly.  
We further examine the effects of the relative weights of the funds. The ratio 
of Innofund support over total free cash of the firm is used to replace InnoAmtit, and 
the regressions conducted in Table 5 are repeated. However, the results show that the 
abovementioned relative measure does not affect the innovation outputs of firms 
significantly (results are provided upon request).  
R&D input is an important factor that may affect the grant of funds. However, 
the ASIFP database does not provide complete information on the R&D expenses of 
firms and only contains information for 2005, 2006, and 2007. Hence, a subsample 
analysis is conducted to test whether our results are biased because of the missing 
information. We focus on firms that obtained their first round of Innofund funding in 
2006 and 2007. Innofund-backed firms are matched with non-Innofund-backed firms 
in the year prior to the awarding of the Innofund grant on the basis of the two-digit 
SIC industry code, location, total sales, exports, sales from new products, number of 
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patents, and R&D expense. Estimations in Table 4 are duplicated based on the newly 
matched subsample. The results are presented in Table A-2, which shows that our 
main conclusion remains the same after we control R&D input in the PSM process.  
4.2 Identification  
We have shown that Innofund-backed firms outperform non-Innofund-backed 
firms in terms of sales from new products, exports, and newly awarded patents after 
potential ex-ante selection effects are controlled using the PSM approach. One 
significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its inability to determine the effects 
of unobservable variables. Missing variables instead of Innofund may contribute to 
improved innovation outputs. For instance, we could not measure the R&D ability of 
firms or observe the management capability of executives on the basis of existing data. 
However, both factors may contribute to the innovation outputs of the firms.  
We use two-stage estimations to address the abovementioned identification 
concerns. A proper IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable but unrelated 
with unobserved variables that may affect dependent variables. The first IV used is 
the total number of firms in high-tech zones of the city where the firm is located in 
each given year (Frm_HTZ). High-tech zone is a distinctive type of special economic 
zone (SEZ) in China where central and local governments seek to attract foreign 
direct investment and consequently stimulate the development of the local economy. 
Information on the number of firms in high-tech zones at city level is obtained from 
the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (1999–2007). The second 
IV is the ratio of total investment in fixed assets made by local governments over the 
total GDP at the county level each year (Fxd_Asst). Information on local government 
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investment across 1998 to 2007 is obtained from city yearbooks. Both IVs reflect the 
effort level of the local governments in the developing local economy. We suggest 
that these two IVs can help to identify the probability of a firm winning an Innofund 
grant. However, the IVs should not be directly correlated with the error terms that 
affect the innovation outputs of individual firms. 
The choice of the two IVs is mainly based on the understanding in institutions 
in China. Under the regionally decentralized authoritarian regime in China, the central 
government governs the state through personnel control, whereas local governments 
manage economic activities and allocate resources (Xu, 2011). During the economic 
reform era, local governors compete with each other in terms of economic growth, the 
search for resources, and support from the central government to obtain promotion 
opportunities. The success rate of local Innofund applications is one of the 
performance assessment criteria of local governments. Thus, more ambitious local 
governments are more likely to support local firms in competing for the Innofund 
program and to exert more effort in lobbying the upper-level governments for local 
firms to win Innofund grants. The level of effort of local governments in attracting 
foreign investment and investing in fixed assets is a good indicator to measure how 
ambitious the local governments are. We consequently expect the two IVs to be 
positively correlated to the probability a local firm winning Innofund.  
However, the two IVs should not be directly correlated with the error terms of 
estimations on innovation outputs of individual firms. The two IVs used are measured 
either at the city level or county level, whereas innovation outputs are measured at the 
firm level. That is, we should not expect a direct relationship between the 
measurements of different levels unless externalities from high-tech zone 
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development at city level or investment in fixed assets at county level exist. In 
particular, a potential argument is that innovative firms may tend to cluster 
geographically and consequently generate externalities to each other. However, 
empirical analysis on the spillover effects of high-tech zones or SEZs in China is 
limited, and results are mixed. Several studies find that the establishment and 
development of SEZs significantly and positively affects foreign direct investment, 
physical capital, exports, or outputs of foreign firms at the city or province level 
(Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Wang, 2013; Alder et al., 2013). However, Hu (2007) did 
not obtain evidence of the geographical externalities of high-tech parks. Meanwhile, 
on the basis of firm-level data, Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) reveal that 
firms within SEZs do not generate higher total factor productivity. The existing 
literature suggests that the relationship between the IVs we use and the innovation 
outputs of individual firms may be unclear. Thus, we statistically test the exogeneity 
of the IVs by conducting overidentification estimations (Sargan, 1958).   
Results of the two-stage estimations are reported in Table 6. Panel A of Table 
6 presents the results from the first stage of estimation. The results demonstrate that 
the number of firms in local high-tech zones and the investment in fixed assets made 
by local governments are significantly and positively correlated to whether a firm 
wins Innofund backing at a given year. These results suggest that a firm has a greater 
probability of receiving Innofund support when it is located in a city or county where 
local governments are more ambitious and provide more support to local firms. The 
first stage of estimations confirms the relevance of the instrumental variables.  
The results of the second stage of estimation are presented in Panel B of Table 
6. Sargan tests are performed to test the exogeneity of the two IVs. The results of the 
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Sargan tests indicate that the null hypothesis, which states that the two instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated to the residuals, cannot be rejected for all estimations. 
Thus, the results statistically prove that both the IVs satisfy the conditions of 
qualifications as IVs. Models (1) to (2) indicate that firms generate more sales from 
new products after they obtain Innofund grants compared with non-Innofund firms 
and the same firms before receiving Innofund support. Similar results are observed in 
the number of newly granted patents of all types and the number of newly granted 
invention patents. The outcomes of two-stage estimations are consistent with the 
regression results in Tables 4 and 5. These outcomes empirically confirm that winning 
Innofund support positively affects innovation outputs, even after considering the 
endogenous nature of Innofund.  
5. Innofund Governance and Innofund Effects 
The governance of the Innofund Program experienced a significant change in 
2005 because of policy shock (Section 2). The major feature of this change is that the 
central government substantially delegated the decision making power in project 
screening to local Innofund offices. R&D projects are associated with a high level of 
uncertainty. Thus, any investment in such projects, including government R&D 
funding, depends significantly on screening mechanisms. Hence, we investigate 
whether the change in ex-ante screening systems may influence the effects of 
Innofund on the innovation outputs of the firms.  
Discussions on the relationship between the quality of project selection and 
the organizational structure are abundant. The rationality of human beings is limited. 
Moreover, information gathering, transmission, and processing are costly. Sah and 
Stiglitz (1991) argue that centralized organizations may delay decision making and 
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reduce the total number of projects because of cost constraints and the lack of local 
information unlike decentralized screening systems. Following the information 
approach, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart and Moore (2005) further emphasize 
that a decentralized decision making system may strengthen the incentives of local 
agents in acquiring information and may reduce the overload problem experienced by 
the principal. Stein (2002) predicts that decentralized organizations are more 
attractive when the needed information is “softer” (i.e., the information is difficult for 
outsiders to verify), whereas centralized organizations are more favorable when the 
needed information can be “hardened” (i.e., the information is easier to verify) 
without cost.  
Another strand of research on the organization of decision making is mainly 
derived from soft budget constraints theory. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) suggest 
that a centralized credit market may affect efficiency because of adverse selection and 
the lack of a termination mechanism. Qian and Xu (1998) further posit that 
bureaucracy often results in more mistakes through the rejection of promising projects, 
thus delaying innovation. Decentralized decision making may not only reduce ex-ante 
screening costs but may also terminate bad projects ex-post that both types of errors 
may reduce. Thus, decentralized organizations may increase the number of selected 
projects and reduce errors in accepting or continuing when investing in innovation to 
refinance bad projects. This effect should be more obvious in investment when the 
uncertainty is higher, and the quality of the projects is more difficult to predict ex-ante.  
Empirically, firm-level estimations demonstrate a strong and positive 
relationship between R&D investment decisions and the decentralization of the 
organizational structure. Rajan and Wulf (2006) show a strong movement towards 
flatter corporations in the U.S. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) report a positive 
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association between decentralization and the development of IT adoption. Acemoglu 
et al. (2007) find that, apart from younger firms, more technology-oriented firms are 
more likely to choose decentralization. The aforementioned studies focus on the 
efficiency of the decision making processes and the organizational forms of for-profit 
organizations. However, none of them investigates the relationship between 
decentralization or organizational change and investment decision making for public 
subsidy programs.  
The existing literature suggests the potential consequences of the change of 
Innofund governance in 2005. These projects are expected to be associated with a 
high level of uncertainty and severe information-related issues because the Innofund 
program targets young firms with potential advanced technology in some frontier 
industries. Thus, the efficiency of the information passage and incentives of local 
knowledge holders (i.e., local Innofund offices in our context) are important for 
project selection. The major policy change in 2005 was to delegate more decision 
making power to local Innofund offices. Local Innofund offices had no input in the 
final decision of the awardees before 2005. After 2005, their views have 30% weight 
in the final decision of the awardees. Moreover, the ex-ante funding commitment after 
2005 further enhanced the alignment of interests between the local and central 
Innofund offices. Therefore, this policy change may significantly affect the incentives 
of local Innofund offices and the effects of Innofund. Indeed, as introduced in Section 
2, local Innofund offices took more initiative to experiment with new approaches in 
project selection after 2005. On the basis of existing literature (Dewatripont and 
Maskin 1995; Qian and Xu, 1998; Ahgion and Tirole, 1997; Hart and Moore, 2005), 
the decentralized screening system after 2005 is expected to help in selecting better-
quality projects and consequently have stronger positive effects on firm innovation 
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outputs compared with the centralized screening process before 2005. Moreover, the 
magnified effects of Innofund after 2005 are expected to be stronger on the 
technological innovations of firms. 
To test whether the Innofund effects on innovation changed significantly after 
the change of Innofund governance, a series of regressions for innovation outputs is 
conducted by distinguishing firms backed by Innofund before and after 2005, along 
with their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. The regression equations are listed 
below.  
 
 
 
where all the variables remain the same as those in Equations (1.1) and (1.2), and the 
Innofund dummy variable is replaced with two dummy variables to specify the 
Innofund-backed firms before and after 2005. Inno_2005Befit is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and the support was 
granted before 2005; otherwise, the dummy variable is equal to 0. Inno_2005Aftit is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, 
and the first Innofund has been granted after 2005; otherwise, the dummy variable is 
equal to 0.  
Table 7 reports the regression results for the effects of the change in the 
screening system. Models (1) to (2) show that Inno_2005Befit and Inno_2005Aftit are 
significantly and positively correlated with the sales from new products measured by 
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log-link formulation of absolute number and dummy variable. The results are 
consistent with the findings shown in Table 4. To test the significance of the policy 
change effects, we conduct Lincom tests and statistically examine the difference of 
the coefficients of Inno_2005Befit and Inno_2005Aftit. However, the Lincom tests 
suggest that the difference between the two coefficients is statistically insignificant 
although the coefficients of Inno_2005Aftit are larger than those of Inno_2005Befit in 
Models (1) and (2). Models (3) to (4) present the estimations for exports. The results 
are similar to those that we observed with the sales from new products. Models (1) to 
(4) indicate that the effects of Innofund on commercialized innovation outputs do not 
seem to significantly change after 2005 when the governance of the government R&D 
program was changed.  
The findings shown in Models (5) and (6) are different. The models show that 
Inno_2005Befit and Inno_2005Aftit are significantly and positively associated with 
newly granted patents of all types and invention patents. Moreover, the coefficients of 
Inno_2005Aftit are consistently and significantly larger than those of Inno_2005Befit 
in both regression models. Model (5) indicates that after gaining Innofund support, the 
growth of newly granted patents of all types generated by Innofund-backed firms 
selected before 2005 is 11.4% higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the 
same firms before winning the grant. The growth of newly granted patents of all types 
by Innofund-backed firms selected after 2005 is 16.2% higher than that of non-
Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before winning the grant. Model (6) 
demonstrates that after winning the Innofund grant, the growth of newly granted 
invention patents generated by Innofund-backed firms selected before 2005 is 7.6% 
higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before winning the 
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grant. After the firms win Innofund support, the growth of newly granted invention 
patents by Innofund-backed firms selected after 2005 is 10.1% higher than that of 
non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before winning the grant. Moreover, 
the Lincom tests statistically confirm that the growth of both newly granted patents of 
all types and invention patents is significantly higher for firms that win the Innofund 
grant after 2005. 
These findings suggest that the significant improvement of Innofund effects on 
technological innovation outputs after the governance of Innofund was systematically 
changed in 2005. However, the policy change in 2005 does not seem to affect the 
commercialized innovation outputs of the firms.  
A few alternative mechanisms may exist for the results of the 2005 effects. For 
instance, the property rights protection was improved since 2004, which may be one 
of the alternative mechanisms that helped enhance the effects of Innofund.12 With 
better protection of private property rights, firms may have stronger incentives to 
invest in R&D activities after 2004 than before in general. Second, the improved 
protection for intellectual property rights since 2003 may also contribute to the 
enhanced Innofund effects after 2005.13 Given that IPR is an important system that 
protects and promotes R&D investment, the improved IPR protection in China since 
2003 may stimulate investment in corporate R&D activities.  
                                                     
12 Specifically, in 2004, the state constitution of China was amended, and the protection of private property rights 
was constitutionalized for the first time. Although the private sector was legally recognized in the mid-1990s, the 
protection of private rights was not recognized by the constitution until 2004. 
13 Starting from 2003, China and the United States have held a round-table conference on IPR every year, and they 
have reached agreements on many IPR-related issues at two round-table conferences. In 2004, China and Europe 
held their first round of talks on IPR in Beijing, and an initial agreement was reached between the two sides on 
matters of cooperation related to IPR. With more interactions and cooperation with US and Europe, the 
enforcement of IPR protection was significantly improved in China. Statistics have shown a sharp increase in 
patent application. Patent applications in China had exceeded two million by March 17, 2004. It took China 15 
years for patent applications to reach one million. However it took only four years for the number to double from 
2000 to 2004. 
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The abovementioned two institutional changes may be relevant to the 
enhanced Innofund effects observed after 2005. However, these institutional elements 
should have effects on Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms at the same 
time, although the marginal effects may be different for the two types of firms. 
Nevertheless, in our panel estimations, we observe the before-and-after changes and 
the differences between Innofund-backed firms and non-Innofund-backed firms in 
terms of innovation outputs while using 2005 as a cut-off. Moreover, as shown in the 
data, the rejection rate of Innofund application significantly decreased after 2005, thus 
suggesting that the local IAC becomes more careful in project selection when it has 
more decision-making power in project screening and needs to commit the matching 
funds upfront. Therefore, we suggest that the change of governance of Innofund is a 
more direct factor contributing to the enhanced Innofund effects after 2005. The 
results are consistent with the arguments of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Ahgion 
and Tirole (1997), and Qian and Xu (1998). These researchers propose a more 
decentralized screening system for investing in R&D-oriented projects when the 
degree of uncertainty is higher and the information issues are more severe.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper estimates the effects of Innofund on the innovation outputs of firms. 
Innofund is one of the largest Chinese government programs that target corporate 
R&D activities of SMEs in China. We examine how the governance of such a 
program influences the effects of Innofund aside from its general effects on the 
innovation outputs of firms.  
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Innofund-backed firms generate significantly more innovation outputs 
compared with non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before Innofund 
funding was infused. We use PSM methodology to control the selection issues. The 
results remain robust after using two-stage Heckman estimations to further address 
the identification problems. These findings are consistent with several existing studies, 
which argue that government funding stimulates corporate R&D activities (Irwin and 
Klenow 1996; Griliches and Regev, 1998; Audretsch et al., 2002; Lach, 2002; Görg 
and Strobl, 2007). Furthermore, Innofund effects differ before and after 2005 when 
governance of Innofund was shifted. The effect of Innofund support on the 
technological innovation outputs of firms further improved after 2005 when project 
screening became more decentralized. These results are consistent with the findings 
reported by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Ahgion and Tirole (1997), and Qian and 
Xu (1998).  
This study provides a new perspective for evaluating government R&D policy. 
We extend the existing studies on government R&D programs by looking further at 
the governance of the government R&D programs and their influence on the effects of 
such programs that have been largely neglected by extant literature. Meanwhile, as a 
first systematic examination of government-supported corporate R&D programs in 
China, this study extends the extant literature by exploring how the market failures 
and the government engagements interact under weak institutions in China. Finally, 
this study is also related to the literature on general R&D financing mechanisms by 
exploring the governance of the financial institutions and the effects of the investment. 
This study has important policy implications. The findings of this study 
suggest that decentralized governance may ease the information issues and motivate 
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local governments to exert more effort in project selection and ex-post monitoring 
activities, thus improving the effects of government R&D programs. Moreover, the 
Chinese government has continually emphasized the role of innovation in fostering a 
sustainable economy and allocated public funds at an accelerating rate to support 
R&D activities. Driven by government policy, China’s R&D expenditure has grown 
into the second largest worldwide since 2010 (WSJ, 2010) and is expected to become 
the largest worldwide by 2022 (KPMG, 2013). China’s current R&D expenditure over 
GDP ratio is higher than that of the European Union (Noorden, 2014), and its total 
number of patent applications has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2011 (KPMG, 
2013). 14  Public support for industrial innovation in China is a major topic in 
international political economy because it determines the sustainability of China’s 
growth and affects the competitive landscape of the global economy. However, solid 
empirical analysis on the consequences of public support has yet to be conducted. 
This assessment of Innofund program and its governance should have some important 
policy implication on how we view the innovation capacity in China.  
This study also raises several questions for further research. First, if 
government R&D programs indeed contribute to the innovation outputs of the firms, 
are innovation outputs simultaneously transferred to improvements in the productivity 
or profitability of the firms? Second, can other mechanisms (e.g., property right 
institutions, IPR protection, financial budget constraints [Qian and Xu, 1998; Huang 
and Xu, 1999], product competition, and input markets or trust and relationships 
                                                     
14  Noorden, Richard Van, 2014, “China tops Europe in R&D Intensity,” Nature, 08 Jan. 2014, 
(http://www.nature.com/news/china-tops-europe-in-rd-intensity-1.14476); WSJ,2010,“China Surpasses Japan in 
R&D as Powers Shift,” Wall Street Journal, 13/12/2010; KPMG, 2013, “Innovated in China: New Frontier for 
Global R&D,”  
(http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Newsletters/China-360/Documents/China-
360-Issue11-201308-new-frontier-for-global-R-and-D.pdf)  
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[Allen, et al., 2012]) influence the effect of government R&D funding? If so, how do 
different mechanisms work together or interact with one another? Third, do the effects 
of different forms of government R&D programs vary? If so, what are the 
explanations or mechanisms for the observed differences? Finally, do government 
R&D programs have spillover effects? 
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